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ARGUMENT
I.

BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE, THE PARTIES WERE
ASSURED OF FINDINGS THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, CLEARLY ERRONEOUS .
It is evident from the Appellee's brief that he wants things both ways: In

other words, admission of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the
unambiguous terms of the parties' contract regarding "subject matter," but
exclusion of the same evidence when it comes to "price." There is no way to
square this approach, and this is the problem with the trial court's ruling.
The REPC was a form contract that has been used without exception in this
State for many years. If it was unambiguous on the subject of price, it was
unambiguous on the subject matter. Flores never demonstrated how the language
of the contract was ambiguous, but only when applied to the circumstances of this
case.
We demonstrated that this is the province of contract "integration," not
interpretation, and it is undisputed that the parties' contract was fully integrated.1
Therefore, the parties' subjective "intent" could not be the proper subject of the

1

Though it is not correct to say, as did Flores that "the Trial Court found that the REPC was folly integrated." (Pg.
7, Brief of Appellee) We demonstrated the trial court's finding that the REPC was only "partially" integrated. (R.
101) We also explained how this was the source of the trial court's erroneous ruling on contract interpretation.
(Arguments, Section I, Brief of Appellant)

trial court's analysis. See WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp.,
2002 UT 88,1J121, 26-26, 54 P.3d 1139
If the contract was unambiguous, the trial court should not have admitted
any extrinsic evidence. However, if it was ambiguous, the trial court erred in
excluding relevant evidence that bore on the alleged ambiguity {i.e., the price for
which the built-out condominium was to be sold).
If the goal was to reach the parties' "intent," it was wrong for the trial court
to consider some but not all the evidence bearing on the subject. What we are left
with is nothing resembling the parties' agreement.
There is no authority for the trial court's approach to this matter. Flores has
certainly offered none. He refers this Court (pg. 8, Brief of Appellee) to his PostTrial Memorandum, re: Extrinsic Evidence. (R. 82) (Addendum A, Brief of
Appellee) However, there is nothing in that memorandum addressing this specific
question.
In this regard, it is important to note that the trial court did not "find" the
facts in Flores' favor. It simply found them to be sufficiently "reasonable" (R.
101) to support a determination that the contract was ambiguous. Peterson v.
Sunrider Corp, 2002 UT 43, fl9, 48 P.3d 918 This serves to show what the trial

2

court was thinking: Exclude extrinsic evidence where it conflicted with the trial
court's flawed legal reasoning regarding ambiguousness.
Therefore, this is not your typical case where the losing party objects to the
trial court's weighing of conflicting evidence (though there is an aspect of that in
this appeal). By purposefully excluding relevant extrinsic evidence from the
determination of the parties' "intent," the parties were assured offindingsthat
were not supported by the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
In this regard, it is also important to note that Flores has taken no exception
to Eamshaw's marshalling of the evidence supporting the trial court judgment.2
Even more significant, Flores has taken no exception with Earnshaw's marshalling
of the evidence that the trial court refused to consider. (Pp. 8-12, Brief of
Appellant)
It requires no weighing of the evidence to see how different the findings
may have been if this critical evidence had been considered. For this reason, we
are confident that the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the
district court, is legally insufficient to support the trial court'sfindings.In re
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,1J45 n.14, 86 P.3d 712

2

"Defendant does properly recite facts from the record (beginning on page 8 of his Brief) in support of his claim
that the findings of the Court.. .were not supported by the evidence...." (Pg. 3, Brief of Appellee)

3

CONCLUSION
The trial court judgment was wrong on both counts: The REPC was not
ambiguous, and it was error to admit extrinsic evidence that altered or varied its
express terms. If the REPC was ambiguous, it was error to exclude relevant
extrinsic evidence because it resulted infindingsthat were not supported by the
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
For the foregoing, additional reasons, the trial court's Memorandum
Decision (R. 095) should be REVERSED and the Order and Judgment (R. 139)
VACATED.
DATED this ^ ^ day of October, 2008.
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC

By V f l A J i ^ L ^ J H K Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Appellant
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